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Abstract: This paper reports an experiment testing whether strategically equivalent representations of a
social situation produce equivalent behavior when actually played by human subjects. The investigation
was limited to representative members of the class of generic 2×2 extensive form games of perfect
information, which include widely studied games in the experimental literature, and the resulting class of
2×2 strategic form games. We find a systematic difference between subjects’ choices in the strategic and
extensive form representations of these games. The observed behavioral difference between game forms
cannot be attributed to differences in subjects’ ability to do backwards induction, differences in the
salience of interpersonal preferences, or differences in optimization premiums between the two game
forms. Instead, subjects in the extensive form are consistently more likely to choose a branch that allows
the other player to make a meaningful choice. We hypothesize that the extensive form elicits more
inclusive behavior than the strategic form.
We would like to thank Ray Battalio, Yan Chen, Cary Deck, John Kagel, Mari Rege, and Bob Slonim for
their helpful comments.  Any errors found in this paper are solely our own. Andy Lucassen, Jill Burness,
Chris Ball, Nick McKinney, and Jana Joswiak provided research assistance.  The National Science
Foundation provided financial support. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations
expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Science Foundation.1 See von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) for the seminal derivation and Kuhn (1953) for the reformulation used
today.
2 The classical statement from Von Neumann and Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 1947, p.
79 is the following: "Imagine now that each player k = 1, ..., n, instead of making each decision as the necessity for
it arises, makes up his mind in advance for all possible contingencies; i.e. that the player k begins to play with a
complete plan: a plan which specifies what choices he will make in every possible situation, for every possible
actual information which he may possess at that moment in conformity with the pattern of information which the
rules of the game provide for him for that case. We call such a plan a strategy.
Observe that if we require each player to start the game with a complete plan of this kind, i.e. with a
strategy, we by no means restrict his freedom of action. In particular, we do not thereby force him to make decisions
on the basis of less information than there would be available for him in each practical instance in an actual play.
This is because the strategy is supposed to specify every particular decision only as a function of just that amount of
actual information which would be available for this purpose in an actual play. The only extra burden our
assumption puts on the player is the intellectual one to be prepared with a rule of behavior for all eventualities --
although he is to go through one play only. But this is an innocuous assumption within the confines of a
mathematical analysis."
A modern statement can be found in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, p. 1011), “No reasonable definition of
rationality could imply a different behavior for the strategist when he has to give instructions to his agents in
advance of the play, as compared to the situation where he would have to carry out those instructions himself.”
3See Schotter, Weigelt, and Wilson (1994) and Deck (2000). 
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1. Introduction
Strategic rationality as developed in the classical game theory literature provides a potentially
useful theory of similarity between various social situations. It furnishes a powerful reduction of
complicated situations into a neat specification of players, strategies, and preferences.
1 In particular, the
concept of a pure strategy allows one to transform the extensive form representation of a situation into
the strategic form representation, which is analytically more tractable.  If individuals are strategically
rational, they should make identical decisions in an extensive form game and the resulting strategic form
game.
2   This paper reports an experiment testing whether strategically equivalent representations of a
situation produce equivalent behavior when actually played by human subjects.
While experimenters have previously found evidence against the behavioral equivalence of the
strategic and extensive forms,
3 this evidence is narrow, based on a few cleverly constructed examples,
and does not yield any general conclusions about why differences occur between the two representations. 
In our experiment, we test the equivalence between the strategic and extensive forms of representative
members of the class of generic 2×2 extensive form games of perfect information and the resulting class
of 2×2 strategic form games. These include a number of games that have been widely studied in the
literature such as Selten’s (1978) chain store paradox and Krep’s (1990) trust game. For each of these
games, subjects are asked to make a choice for each role in both the extensive and strategic form
representation of the games. The experiment is designed to give the pure strategy hypothesis its best
possible chance -- the strategic and extensive form treatments only differ in how the games are presented. 4See McKelvey and Palfrey (1995 and 1998) and Battalio, Samuelson, and Van Huyck (2001).
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Subjects only make a single choice in each role and each form, and receive no feedback between
decisions. We therefore have a clean within subject test of the pure strategy hypothesis across a broad
class of games.
A number of reasons exist why, ex ante, we might expect to see differences in play between the
strategic and extensive form representations of a game.  First, play might differ between the two game
forms due to increased salience for deductive concepts such as backwards induction in the extensive form
representation.  This is the source of potential variation stressed by Schotter, Wilson, and Weigelt in their
examination of differences between the extensive and normal forms. Another possibility is that subjects
put greater weight on other-regarding preferences in the extensive form.  This would seem particularly
true for models that incorporate intentionality, as the extensive form representation makes it clear that a
second players' decision is contingent on the first player's choice.  A final possibility grows out of
economists' increasing awareness that models of noisy decision-making substantially improve our ability
to predict subjects' choices over models without mistakes.
4  A key assumption in developing a general
model of mistakes is that the probability a player fails to give a best response is inversely related to the
optimization premium.  If changing the presentation of the game changes the optimization premium,
differences in behavior between the two presentations should result.  
 We find systematic differences between subjects' choices in the strategic and extensive forms of
these games. These differences cannot be explained by any of the possibilities raised above. Instead,
subjects in the Player 1 role are more likely to choose a branch that allows the other player to make a
choice that influences payoffs in the extensive form than in the strategic form.. We hypothesize that the
extensive form elicits inclusive behavior.  In particular, suppose subjects have a preference for allowing
both players to have some influence over the final distribution of payoffs.  If this preference is more
salient when the game is presented in its extensive form, it would produce the effects seen in our data.
Such a phenomenon would be quite important to economists; as such, we suggest directions for future
research to investigate this new hypothesis.
2.  Experimental Design
We begin this section by discussing the selection of games to be studied.  We then outline the
procedures used in running the experiments.
Selection of Games:  To focus our analysis, we examine the class of generic 2×2 extensive form games of
perfect information and the resulting class of 2×2 strategic form games (see Figure 1). The class contains5There are six possible orderings over the three payoffs for each of the players.  Avoiding interpersonal comparisons
of payoffs, this yields 36 possible pairs of orderings over the two players payoffs.
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36 members,
5 including Selten’s (1978) chain store game and Krep’s (1990) trust game. It is the simplest
class of extensive form games that maintains strategic interdependence between the players. 
[Figure 1 here]
Of these 36 members, half are isomorphic transformations of other members of the class obtained
by relabeling actions. We choose to maintain the assumption that behavior will be invariant to a
relabeling of actions and eliminate the isomorphic transformations, leaving 18 games to be considered.
In this class of games, the second mover always has a weakly dominant strategy. The first mover
has a strictly dominant strategy to pick t in six games and to pick b in six games. In this sense, these
games don’t involve any meaningful strategic interdependence under the assumed preferences. We select
one of each type to include in the experimental design. The remaining six games all require the first
mover to forecast what the second mover will do in order to determine a best response. We investigate all
six making a total of eight games studied below. 
Figure 2 summarizes the eight games. The subgame perfect equilibrium for each game is found
by following the doubled line from the root of the tree to a terminal node. Game 1 has not been widely
studied. Games 2 and 5 each have an equilibrium in dominant strategies. Game 3 is Krep’s (1990) trust
the kindness of strangers game. Game 4 is a team game. Like Game 3, Game 5 gives Player 2 an
opportunity to reciprocate the kindness of strangers. Game 6 is Selten’s (1978) chain store game. Game 7
is a strictly competitive game that has not been widely studied to our knowledge. Game 8 is Beard and
Beil’s (1994) trust the rationality of strangers game. Games 5,6, and 8 have two Nash equilibria, one of
which is not subgame perfect.
[Figure 2 here]
Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1947) concept of a pure strategy allows one to transform the
extensive form representation of a social situation into the strategic form. A pure strategy assigns an
action to every information set controlled by the player. For the class of extensive form games considered
here the pure strategy abstraction assumption results in 2×2 bimatrix strategic form games.  (See the right
panel of Figure 1.)
Experimental Procedures:  Human subjects made a series of choices using pen and paper. Each subject
made decisions for both roles in both the strategic and extensive form representation of all eight games.
The subjects made their choices in the row and column role by checking a box and in the first and second
mover roles by drawing a line. All of the choices in a single role were presented on one decision page.6Along with the eight strategic form games we were studying, we also included a bargaining game studied in
Battalio and Van Huyck (2000) using a computer interface.  This game was included to verify the consistency of our
results with earlier experiments.
7This order was held constant in all sessions.  Given that subjects received no feedback between filling out the
various sheets, we feel it is unlikely that order effects could lead to the systematic differences between the strategic
and extensive forms observed in the data.
8Schotter et al also use a design in which subjects receive no information about their opponent’s choice until after
both choices have been made.  Deck’s design lets Player 2s in the extensive form games see the move of the Player
1s before making a decision.
9 Except that games five and eight were flipped on the extensive form pages.
10 The instructions for the Player 2 forms tell the subjects "your choice will be matched with each of the other first
mover choices." This implicitly tells the subjects that the same games are being played on the Player 1 and Player 2
forms. But since the Player 1 forms have already been collected, only subjects with an exceptionally good memory
would know what the payoffs were if the Player 1 picked the branch leading to a terminal node.
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The page contained eight games plus a ninth game unrelated to the experimental design.
6 Each decision
page was passed out, filed out, and collected before the next decision page was passed out. First the
subjects played the Player 1 (row) role in the strategic form, then the Player 2 (column) role in the
strategic form, then the Player 1 (first mover) role in the extensive form, and finally, the Player 2 (second
mover) role in the extensive form.
7 The paper instrument always used green ink to show the subject's own
payoffs and blue ink to show the other participant's payoffs. The subjects received no feed back until the
end of the experiment.
The experiments are designed to give strategic rationality its best chance.  The information
available to subjects and the timing of decisions were in fact identical between the strategic and
extensive form representations.  The only difference between the two treatments was in how the games
were presented to the subjects.
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Two instruments were used. In the first, the games were always presented in identical order
9 and
only the subgame resulting from the first mover chosing t was shown on the decision page for the second
mover. If subjects did not recall the earlier decision pages and did not recognize the pattern in the order
of the games, then they did not know what payoffs Player 1 had foregone in allowing Player 2 to make a
choice.
10  Since other regarding behavior and intentionality have become an important part of the
explanation for anomalous behavior in simple games, we designed a second instrument. The second
instrument, scrambled the games making it more difficult to notice the relationship between the roles and
game forms and showed the whole extensive form on the decision page for the second mover.
The subjects were explicitly told they were playing against the choices made by the other
participants in the session. Their earnings were determined using a mean matching protocol, that is, they
received the average payoff determined by the empirical distribution of the other participant’s choices.
The mean matching protocol was explained to the subjects through examples. Subjects were paid in cash
for all decisions they made. Their average payoff from these 32 choices was $12.75. This does not11 Three sessions with 75 subjects participated in the dictator games experiment prior to participating in our
experiment and three sessions with 112 subjects played our experiment first. 
5
include their earnings from any other games played in the session. Subjects were also given their choice
of $4 cash or a parking pass worth $4.
Subjects made other decisions not reported in this paper. These decision pages contained
variations on the dictator game with differing prices (see Andreoni and Miller, 2001). In some sessions,
the 2×2 games were presented first and in some sessions the dictator games were presented first. No
feedback was given until the end of the session when earnings were computed. There is no theoretical
reason to believe that participating in the dictator experiment would affect play in our experiment, and
indeed no statistically significant effect is found in the data.
A total of 187 subjects participated in the experiment. Three sessions with a total of 99 subjects
used the first instrument in which the second mover decision page only showed the subgames resulting
from a choice of t and the games were not scrambled, and three sessions with a total of 88 subjects used
the second instrument in which the second mover decision page showed the entire extensive form and the
games were scrambled.
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Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate population at Texas A&M University using
email solicitations. Prior to the start of the experiment, a set of instructions was read out loud to all
subjects. These instructions explained how to fill out the instrument and how to calculate earnings. A
copy of the instructions and decision instrument one are attached to this paper as Appendix A.
3.  Analytical Framework
Prior to running any experiments, we had a number of hypotheses about why differences might
(or might not exist between the two treatments.  The strongest of these, harkening back to von Neumann
and Morgenstern’s discussion of strategic equivalence of the strategic and extensive forms, is the pure
strategy hypothesis.
Pure Strategy Hypothesis: Behavior in the strategic and extensive forms will be statistically
indistinguishable.
If people are not strategically rational, then there are many ways in which the presentation of a
social situation can influence behavior. Schotter, Weigelt, and Wilson (1994) explore the behavioral
hypothesis that the presentation of a strategic situation can facilitate the use of alternative solution
concepts. For example, backwards induction may be more salient in the extensive form representation,12Equivalently, one can think about iterated removal of weakly dominated strategies.
13The use of a mean matching protocol should not reduce the saliency of reciprocity for Player 2s.  By the nature of
the game, Player 2s know their action only affects Player 1s that have chosen t.  While the ability of any one Player
2 to reward (or punish) any one Player 1 is small, they are able to affect all Player 1s who have treated them well (or
poorly).  Thus, the overall impact of a Player 2's choice is substantial.
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where the timing is laid out explicitly.
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Backwards Induction Hypothesis: Subjects are more likely to make choices consistent with subgame
perfection in the extensive form representation of the social situation.
Another possible source of difference in behavior between the two representations reflects other-
regarding preferences.  In recent years, experimental economists have found extensive evidence that
subjects preferences over outcomes in games depend not only on their own monetary outcomes, but also
on the outcomes of others and on the path of play that lead to the outcome.  Prominent recent examples
of this work include Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Charness and Rabin
(2000).  Emotions as varied as altruism, envy, reciprocity, and spite fall under the umbrella of these
models.  At this point in time, it would be difficult to say that there exists either a clearly defined set of
empirical regularities that are in need of explaining or a definitive model of other-regarding behavior.  As
such, it is impossible to identify all the possible ways in which other-regarding preferences might
manifest themselves.  To narrow down the possible effects, we focus on a strong empirical regularity that
has been observed in a wide variety of experiments, reciprocity: reward those who have treated you well
and punish those who have treated you poorly. We examine the data for evidence of more (or less)
reciprocity in the extensive form representation.
For Player 2s, it is clear what it means for play to be more (or less) consistent with reciprocity in
the extensive form representation. In Games 1 and 6, a choice of t unambiguously harms Player 2s.  If
reciprocity is more (less) salient for Player 2s in the extensive form representation, we would expect to
see them choosing the action that harms Player 1 more (less) frequently – R in either Game 1 or Game 6. 
In Games 2, 3, 5, and 8, a choice of t unambiguously helps Player 2s.  If reciprocity is more (less) salient
for Player 2s in the extensive form representation, we would expect to see them choosing the action that
helps Player 1 more (less) frequently -- R in Games 2 and 5 and L in Games 3 and 8.
13  It is worth noting
that movements towards more reciprocal behavior are often not consistent with movement towards
subgame pefection (see Games 2, 3, 5, and 6).  As such, there is some hope for sorting out between the
backwards induction hypothesis and the reciprocity hypothesis.
Reciprocity Hypothesis: Player 2s are more likely to act reciprocally in the extensive form presentation. 7
This implies they should choose R more frequently in Games 1, 2, 5, and 6, and should choose L more
frequently in Games 3 and 8.
Probabilistic choice models beginning with Luce (1959) can explain behavior inconsistent with
backwards induction. A particularly interesting assumption to make regarding noisy choices is that better
responses are more likely than inferior responses, but all responses have positive probability. If choices
are sensitive to the optimization premium and optimization premiums are sensitive to how the game is
presented, then behavior will violate the pure strategy hypothesis.
It is easiest to see how the pure strategy hypothesis can be violated when the “errors” players
make are sensitive to the optimization premium by first focusing on Player 2: either the column player or
second mover. Let p|f denote Player 2's assessment of the probability Player 1 will play t subject to
playing game form f, where f is either e for extensive or s for strategic. Let Eπ2(a, p|f) denote the
expected payoff from action a, either L or R, against assessment p in game form f. Let r2(p|f) denote the
optimization premium for Player 2 given assessment p in game form f.  Then for the class of games
represented in figure 1 the optimization premium for Player 2s is given by equation 1. 
r2(p|f) = Eπ2(L, p|f) - Eπ2(R, p|f) = 
((p|f) φ + (1-(p|f)) δ) - ( (p|f) ψ + (1-(p|f)) δ) = (p|f) (φ - ψ)  (eq. 1)
To the extent that subjects’ assessments of p is affected by the presentation of the game, (p|s) …
(p|e), we should expect see differences in Player 2s’ choices between the two representations due to
differences in the optimization premium.  
Calculating the optimization premium for Player 1s is only somewhat more complicated.  Let q|f
denote Player 1's assessment of the probability Player 2 will play L subject to playing game form f, where
f is either e for extensive or s for strategic. Let Eπ1(a, q|f) denote the expected payoff from action a,
either t or b, against assessment q in game form f. Let r1(q|f) denote the optimization premium for Player
1 given assessment q in game form f.  Then for the class of games represented in figure 1 the
optimization premium for Player 1s is given by equation 2.
r1(q|f) = Eπ1(t, q|f) - Eπ1(b, q|f) = 
((q|f) β + (1-(q|f)) γ) - α = (q|f) (β - γ) + (γ - α)  (eq. 2)
As above, if subjects’ assessments of q is affected by the presentation of the game, (q|s) … (q|e),
we should expect see differences in Player 2s’ choices between the two representations.  14Intuitively, Player 2s know for certain if their decision is payoff relevant.  This is equivalent to setting p = 1.
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We have no way of directly observing players’ assessments of p and q.  However, we can
observe the empirical values of the variables and the empirical optimization premiums that result.  To the
extent that subjects’ assessments of p and q correspond to the actually empirical frequencies, changes in
behavior between the two representations should be correlated with changes in the empirical optimization
premiums.
Optimization Premium Hypothesis: Changes in behavior between the strategic and normal form
representations are driven by changes in the (empirical) optimization premium.
The preceding discussion begs the question of why the optimization premium ought to be
different between the two representations.  To some extent, changes in the empirical optimization
premiums give us a mechanism to capture indirect effects from the backward induction and reciprocity
hypotheses.  For example, suppose Player 2s are more responsive to issues of reciprocity in the extensive
form representation.  This changes the empirical optimization premium for Player 1s.  To the extent that
this change is anticipated, the behavior of Player 1s should also differ between the two representations. 
More generally, the error term in models like quantile response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995
and 1998) is meant to capture the unmodeled parts of subjects’ preferences.  To the extent that the error
terms are unmodeled, there is no particular reason why they can’t differ between representations.
Subjects’ perceived optimization premiums may change even if the empirical optimization
premiums do not.  For example, it is straight forward to show that the optimization premium for Player 2s
in the extensive form is greater than the optimization premium for Player 2s in the strategic form if the
extensive form game is played sequentially.
14  To extent that subjects perceive the extensive form
representation as being more like the sequential game, changes in Player 2s’ behavior should result due
to changes in the perceived optimization premium.  While such changes are a theoretical possibility, they
rely on subjects’ unobservable beliefs and, for the case described above, cannot easily be distinguished
from the backward induction hypothesis.  As such, we prefer to focus on the empirical optimization
premiums.
4.  Experimental Results
Table 1 summarizes the primary empirical results of the paper. The top half of the table shows
data for the Player 1 role, and the bottom half shows data for the Player 2 role. Strategic rationality
makes a sharp prediction for both roles in all games in both forms: either everyone plays one action or9
the other. The actual frequency of t ranged from 0.278 in the strategic form of game 5 to 0.909 in the
strategic form of game 2. The actual frequency of L ranged from 0.187 in the strategic form of game 7 to
0.920 in both forms of game 4. The largest deviations from predicted behavior occurs in the Player 1 role
of the extensive form representation of game 3, Krep’s (1990) trust the kindness of strangers game, and
in the Player 1 role of the strategic form representation of game 6, Selten’s (1978) chain store game. In
both of these cases, the majority of subjects did not choose the predicted behavior.
[Table 1 here]
There is a great deal of heterogeneity in the population. For each of the 32 choices in the
experiment, we can calculate the percentage of subjects choosing the less frequent of the two possible
choices. The minimum for this variable is 8%, and the median is 28%. This is extraordinary given that
the column players always have a weakly dominant strategy and the row players have a strictly dominant
strategy for Games 2 and 5. Even if we only consider the choices with a (weakly) dominant strategy, the
median percentage of subjects choosing the dominated strategy is 19%.
Even at an individual level substantial heterogeneity is observed. The column labeled “fraction
switching” in Table 1 reports the fraction of subjects who changed their choice in either direction
between the strategic and extensive form representation of the games. (Recall that each subject played
both roles of both forms of all eight games.) The choices of individual subjects often vary between the
strategic and extensive form representations of a game. Looking at the 16 choices that are made in both
the strategic and extensive form games, the minimum percentage of subjects switching their choice
between the two forms is 10%, and the median percentage is 35%. 
Just because subjects frequently switch their choices between representations, it need not follow
that there is a systematic pattern to these switches.  Looking for systematic differences, the column
labeled “difference between forms” in Table 1 reports the difference between the actual play of t or L in
the strategic and extensive forms. The next three columns of Table 1 report the results of tests for
statistically significant differences between the two representations. We use McNemar's test for
significance of changes, a form of chi-squared test that accounts for the paired nature of the observations
(Siegel and Castellan, 1988, p. 75 – 80). The null hypothesis is that the proportion of subjects switching
from top to bottom (or left to right for column players) between the two representations is the same as the
proportion switching in the opposite direction. In other words, we are testing whether the difference
between the representations is significantly different from zero. We report rejections of the null at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance. Of the 16 possible differences between the two representations,
7 are at least significant at the 10% level of significance. Naively treating these 16 tests as statistically
independent, the likelihood of getting 7 or more false rejections out of 16 at the 10% level is 6.1 × 10
-5.10
Conclusion 1: There are significant differences in play between the two representations. We reject the
pure strategy hypothesis.
The economic significance of these differences is modest. The maximum difference observed is
only 15% (see the Player 1 role in game 5). The differences between the two representations are more
systematic for Player 1s than for Player 2s. The changes are positive in seven of the eight games for the
Player 1 role, but are only positive in four of eight games for the Player 2 role. The Player 1 role changes
are not only more consistently positive but also larger in absolute value. Looking at the tests of statistical
significance for the Player 1s, there are significant changes in play for five of the eight games. A number
of these are quite strong, with the differences for Games 4 and 5 easily significant at the 1% level and the
difference for Game 7 barely missing the 1% level. In contrast, there are only significant changes in two
of the eight games for the Player 2 role. Neither of the differences is even close to reaching the 1% level
of significance.
Conclusion 2: There are much greater differences in play between the two representations for the Player
1 role than for the Player 2 role. 
The penultimate columns of Table 1 report whether the difference between representations for
the game is in the direction predicted by the backwards induction or reciprocity hypotheses.  If so, this is
indicated by an X.  For the reciprocity hypothesis, no prediction is made for most cases.  This is indicated
by a mark of “---.”  
Only 4 of 16 differences are in the direction predicted by the backwards induction hypothesis.
The extensive form does not seem much better at inducing strategic rationality than the strategic form.
For three of the eight games, the play of Player 1 role is more consistent with subgame perfection in the
extensive form. Looking at only the games in which the change between game forms is significant at the
10% level for Player 1, four of five have play that is less consistent with subgame perfection in the
extensive form.
For the six games in which the reciprocity hypothesis makes predictions for Player 2s, three
show movement towards more reciprocal behavior and three show movement towards less reciprocal
behavior.  Of the two games in which there are statistically significant differences between the two
representations, one shows movement towards more reciprocal behavior and one shows movement away
from reciprocal behavior.  As such, reciprocity seems to have little to do with differences between the15Another type of other-regarding preference that we might have examined is some form of inequality aversion. 
Given that there are few observable differences for Player 2s between the two representations, it is highly unlikely




Conclusion 3: There is little evidence that changes in row players' behavior between the two
representations is organized either by subgame perfection or reciprocity. We reject the backward
induction and reciprocity hypotheses.
Instead of the backward induction or reciprocity hypotheses, we discover an unexpected shift in
favor of t by subjects in the Player 1 role of the extensive form. For seven of the eight games, the Player
1s choose t more frequently in the extensive form representation. Moreover, for all five games where
there are significant differences between the two representations, the row players choose t more
frequently in the extensive form.
Conclusion 4: Subjects in the Player 1 role show a strong movement towards t in the extensive form
representation of the games. In other words, they are more likely to make a choice that leads to a decision
node for Player 2 rather than a terminal node.
Before interpreting the differences in play between the two game forms, we turn to a more
detailed statistical analysis.  Table 2 presents regression analysis of the experimental data. The inclusion
of this analysis has three purposes. First, it allows us to aggregate the data across games. This allows us
to determine if the results described previously are statistical blips that are confined to a few games or
are more general in nature. Second, the regression results let us see whether any of the variations in
treatments we used are responsible for the results.  Finally and most importantly, the regression analysis
allows us to determine whether or not the optimization premium hypothesis can explain the differences
between the strategic and extensive representations.
[Table 2 here]
Given the binary nature of subjects’ choices, all of the regressions reported in Table 2 use a logit
specification. We include fixed effects to reduce the impact of any individual effects (Chamberlain,
1980). The regressions also include dummies for seven of the eight games (with no dummy for Game 1).
While highly significant statistically, these dummies are of little direct interest and hence are suppressed
in Table 2. The regressions included all observations from all subjects. Data from Player 1 roles and
Player 2 roles are analyzed separately. Thus, each of the regressions includes sixteen observations, two
per game, for each of the 187 subjects in the experiment. Standard errors are reported in parentheses16 One implication of this choice of dependent variables is that the fixed effects are capturing a subject’s
predilection towards using one of the strategies (e.g. t vs. b). It may instead be true that subjects have a greater or
lesser predilection towards using the subgame perfect action. We have run regressions using this sort of
specification, and get qualitatively identical results. We have also looked at models in which there is correlation
between an individual’s switches between representations. These also yield identical qualitative results.
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below the parameter estimates. Tests of statistical significance for parameter estimates are two-tailed z-
tests. 
For the Player 1 regressions, the dependent variable equals 1 if Player 1 chose t and 0 if he chose
b. Thus, positive coefficients indicate that Player 1 is more likely to chose t all else equal. For Player 2
regressions, the dependent variable equals 1 if Player 2 chose L and 0 if he chose R.  Positive coefficients
indicate that Player 2 is more likely to chose L all else equal.
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The independent variables are as follows:
1)  Empirical Optimization Premium: This variable is calculated as the difference in expected
payoffs between t and b for Player 1s and the difference in expected payoffs between L and R for
Player 2s. The expected payoffs are based on the empirical frequencies. Payoff differences are
calculated separately for each representation. For example, the expected payoff from choosing t
in Game 1 in the strategic form is equal to .316*60 + .684*20 = 32.64. The payoff difference for
Game 1 in the strategic form is then the expected payoff from t minus the expected payoff from b
which equals 32.64 - 40 = -7.36. If subjects’ choices are sensitive to the empirical optimization
premium, the coefficient estimate for this variable should be positive.
2)  Extensive form: This variable is coded is a 0 for observations from the strategic form
representation and 1 for observations from the extensive form representation. A positive
coefficient for the dummy means that Player 1s are more likely to choose t in the extensive form
or Player 2s are more likely to choose L in the extensive form.
3)  Interaction between extensive form and subgame perfection: We first create a dummy that is
coded as one if the subgame perfect choice is t for a row player or L for a column player and is
coded as zero otherwise. This variable is then interacted with the variable for the extensive form.
A positive coefficient for this variable means that row players are more likely to choose t in the
extensive form when it is the subgame perfect action and column players are more likely to
choose L in the extensive form if it is the subgame perfect action. Suppose any differences
between the representations were due to greater (lesser) consistency with subgame perfection in
the extensive form. We would expect the coefficient for the interaction between extensive form
and subgame perfection to be positive (negative) and we expect this coefficient to equal negative
two times the coefficient for the extensive form dummy.17Recall that the regressions include dummies for the games.  As such, the parameter for the empirical optimization
premium is identified off differences between representations, not between games.
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4)  Gender: The gender variable is coded as a one for male and a zero for female. This is interacted
with the extensive form dummy. This variable allows us to determine if changes between the
representations are tied to a subject’s gender.
5)  Treatments: We create dummy variables for whether a subject saw the Andreoni-Miller
instrument prior to playing in our experiment, and whether they played in the treatment with
scrambling and full trees as Player 2s in the extensive form representation. These variables are
interacted with the dummy for the extensive form. These variables allow us to determine if
changes between the representations are linked to the treatment being played.
The top half of Table 2 shows regressions on row player data. Model 1 only includes the
empirical optimization premium between t and b. The coefficient estimate is large and statistically
significant at the 1% level. Given that the game variables control for any other differences between the
games, this suggests that subjects do respond to changes in the empirical optimization premium. 
Model 2 only includes an extensive form dummy. The parameter estimate on this variable is
positive and significant at the 1% level. Thus, we find general support for our conclusion that subjects
are more likely to choose t in the extensive form.
Model 3 includes both the empirical optimization premium between t and b and the extensive
form dummy. The coefficient for the extensive form is little changed in magnitude and remains
significant at the 1% level. The coefficient for empirical optimization premium is roughly halved and
only achieves statistical significance at the 10% level.
Conclusion 5: The results of Model 3 indicate that while subjects respond weakly to changes in the
empirical optimization premium, the impact of the extensive form on Player 1s’ choices cannot be
attributed to changes in the empirical optimization premium.  We can therefore reject the optimization
premium hypothesis.
17
Model 4 modifies Model 3 by adding the interaction between the extensive form and subgame18The regressions in Table 2 do not test whether the use of full game trees and scrambling affects the behavior of
Player 2s in general. We therefore ran chi-squared tests separately for each of the eight games to see to see if the use
of full game trees and scrambling affected the choices of Player 2s in the extensive form games. The null hypothesis
being tested is that the likelihood of choosing L is equal between the treatment with partial trees and the treatment
with full trees and scrambling. For none of the eight games could we reject the null at even the 10% level. Changing
how the game trees were presented does not appear to have any impact on Player 2 decisions.
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perfection. Subjects are more likely to switch to top in the extensive form when this is the subgame
perfect action, but the parameter estimate for this variable is not statistically significant at any standard
level. Moreover, the linear restriction that the coefficient for extensive form interacted with subgame
perfection equals negative two times the coefficient for the extensive form variable is rejected at the 1
percent level. Therefore, subgame perfection does not help explain the changes in Player 1s’ choices
between the two representations.  This provides added support for Conclusion 3.  Inclusion of the
interaction between the extensive form and subgame perfection does somewhat reduce the estimate for
the extensive form coefficient, and weakens its statistical significance (largely due to a sharp increase in
the standard error). 
The final regression, Model 5, modifies Model 3 by adding the interaction between the extensive
form and gender and the interactions between the extensive form and the treatment variables. There is no
evidence that our results are being driven by the differing treatments used. The interaction with gender is
weakly significant; the impact of switching to the extensive form is less for men than for women. Women
are almost twice as likely to change their behavior in the extensive form to allow the other player to have
a meaningful choice.
The bottom half of Table 2 shows regressions on Player 2 data. These specifications are
analogous to those run for Player 1s. In none of these regression is there any significant difference
between the two representations. Thus, the small number of differences found for the individual games
do not appear to reflect a general pattern.  Once again, the regressions indicate that subjects weakly




We find significant differences in behavior between the extensive and strategic form
representation of social situations.  These differences are not organized by changes in the saliency of
backwards induction or reciprocity.  Although subjects do consistently respond to changes in the
empirical optimization premium, this does not appear to drive the difference between representations.
Instead, the observed difference appears in the Player 1 role of the extensive form representation
of the games. Our subjects tend to choose the path that allows the second mover to influence the outcome
of the game more frequently than they do in the strategic representation of the situation. We hypothesize
that this effect results from a norm in favor of allowing other people to influence the outcome of social
situations.  We hypothesize that subjects have a preference for inclusion – all individuals affected by the
outcome should be involved in selecting it – and that the extensive form representation makes this
inclusion preference more salient.
It is worth noting that the existing results about differences between representations are
consistent with the inclusion preference we identify in our data. Both Schotter et al and Deck study
games that fall within the class of 2 x 2 games we study. While they give their results quite different
interpretations, both of them actually find that Player 1 is more like to give Player 2 a meaningful choice
in the extensive form. Thus, our results unify the results found by earlier experimenters.  By looking at a
broader class of games, we can for the first time reach some general conclusions about why differences
occur between the strategic and extensive form representations.
Further experimental work is needed to determine the causes underlying the systematic
differences we observe between the strategic and extensive form representations. If our hypothesis that
subjects have preferences for procedural fairness turn out to be correct, this gives us insight into a wide
variety of puzzling phenomena. For example, this bias in favor of including others may be responsible for
some of the results reported in the literature on the trust game. In the trust game including the other may16
be misinterpreted as “trust.” Also, it is common place occurrence that organizations facing a major
decision will devote a large amount of time considering how to go about making the decision and
assuring that all stakeholders within the organization have input on the decision. Often these activities
seem unnecessary, having little impact on the decisions actually reached. However, if individuals indeed
have preferences over how decisions get made, then these apparently wasteful activities are actually
rational.17
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Table 1: Results Summary
Player 1 Role
Actual Play of t Statistical Significance Movement Towards . . .
Strategic Extensive 10% 5% 1% SGPE
More
Reciprocity
1 0.000 0.316 0.412 0.096 X --- 0.385
2 1.000 0.909 0.866 -0.043 --- 0.182
3 0.000 0.583 0.674 0.091 X --- 0.401
4 1.000 0.578 0.722 0.144 X X X X --- 0.401
5 0.000 0.278 0.428 0.150 X X X --- 0.396
6 1.000 0.380 0.439 0.059 X --- 0.455
7 0.000 0.374 0.492 0.118 X X --- 0.406
8 1.000 0.733 0.791 0.059 X --- 0.262
Player 2 Role
Actual play of L Statistical Significance Movement Towards . . .
Strategic Extensive 10% 5% 1% SGPE
More
Reciprocity
1 0.000 0.283 0.294 0.011 0.342
2 1.000 0.738 0.818 0.080 X X 0.316
3 0.000 0.401 0.460 0.059 X 0.380
4 1.000 0.920 0.920 0.000 --- 0.096
5 1.000 0.674 0.572 -0.102 X X X 0.348
6 1.000 0.893 0.872 -0.021 X 0.150
7 0.000 0.187 0.193 0.005 --- 0.273
8 1.000 0.861 0.840 -0.021 0.171
Game
Game
Notes:  All tests of statistical significance are from McNemar's test for significance of changes (Siegel and Castellan, p. 75-80).  
Movement indicates the direction of change in the extensive form using the strategic form as a base.  The data set includes all 
















Dependent Variable: Choice of Top = 1, Bottom = 0
Variable Name Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
















Extensive * Subgame Perfect 0.086
(0.267)
Extensive * Gender
0 = Female, 1 = Male
-0.296+
(0.174)
Extensive * Andreoni-Miller First -0.189
(0.173)
Extensive * Scrambling 0.086
(0.170)
Log-Likelihood -1325.02 -1316.89 -1315.15 -1315.09 -1312.96
Column Players
Dependent Variable: Choice of Left = 1, Right = 0
Variable Name Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
















Extensive * Subgame Perfect 0.081
(0.292)
Extensive * Gender
0 = Female, 1 = Male
0.214
(0.188)
Extensive * Andreoni-Miller First -0.015
(0.188)
Extensive * Scrambling -0.010
(0.186)
Log-Likelihood -1122.68 -1124.21 -1122.67 -1122.63 -1121.98























Game 1 Game 2
Game 3 Game 4
Game 5 Game 6
Game 7 Game 8
FIGURE 2Appendix A: Instrument One
Welcome
This is an experiment about decision making. If you have any questions during this
experiment, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. You will be paid for
participating, and the amount of money you will earn depends on the decisions that you and the
other participants make. Research grants have provided the funds for this experiment.  At the end of
the experiment you will be paid privately and in cash for your decisions.
Session ID Number
At the top of this page is a number on an index card. This is your participant number. Each
participant has a different number. You will want to verify that the number on this card is the same
as the number on the top of each decision form. You will use this number to collect your cash
payment. Please remove your index card now and place it face up on the desk.
Choices
You will be asked to make nine choices about your choice of t or b in an earnings table. You
make choices on the row form by checking a box for one of two rows labeled “t” and “b”
respectively. 
The choices that you make and the choices that all of the other participants in this room make will
determine your earnings. The next page provides an example of how your earnings are calculated.Earnings
Your payoffs will always be indicated by green. Units are cents. You will be paid for all of your
choices. Your earnings for each choice is going to be determined based on the choices of everyone else in the
room. Your row choice will be matched against all of the column choices and you will receive the average of
these earnings. For example, suppose there are 101 people including yourself and suppose that of the 100
other people in the room 75 choose column L and 25 choose column R for the example earnings table.






















Now suppose 25 choose column L and 75 choose column R:






















Please fill out the row choice form, taking the time you need to be accurate. When all participants





















Example Choice of “b”Row Form Participant #_____
Check the box at the end of a row to indicate your choice. Your payoffs are in green. The blue payoffs are
for column participants. Units are cents. Your choice will be matched with each of the other column
participant choices (but not your own). Your earnings for each choice will be determined by summing up your


























































































Choice 9Column Form Participant #_____
Check the box at the bottom of a column to indicate your choice. Your payoffs are in green. The blue
payoffs are for row participants. Units are cents. Your choice will be matched with each of the other row
participant choices (but not your own). Your earnings for each choice will be determined by summing up your
payoff for each match and dividing by the number of matches. Please make nine choices now.
LR
t
10 30
60 20
b
50 50
40 40
  
Choice 1
LR
t
50 30
40 60
b
10 10
20 20
  
Choice 2
LR
t
30 50
60 20
b
10 10
40 40
  
Choice 3
LR
t
50 40
60 20
b
10 10
40 40
  
Choice 9
LR
t
26 10
46 9
b
19 35
11 31
  
Choice 8
LR
t
10 50
60 20
b
30 30
40 40
  
Choice 7
LR
t
30 10
60 20
b
50 50
40 40
  
Choice 6
LR
t
50 30
20 40
b
10 10
60 60
  
Choice 5
LR
t
50 10
60 20
b
30 30
40 40
  
Choice 4